Traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints (by which the demands for certain goods are limited by the corresponding supplies). The rise of smart grid presents a new class of auctions, characterized by quadratic constraints. Yu and Chau [AAMAS 13'] introduced the complex-demand knapsack problem, in which the demands are complex-valued and the capacity of supplies is described by the magnitude of total complex-valued demand. This naturally captures the power constraints in AC electric systems. In this paper, we provide a more complete study and generalize the problem to the multi-minded version, beyond the previously known 
INTRODUCTION
Auctions are vital venues for the interactions of multiagent systems, and their computational efficiency is critical for agent-based automation. Nonetheless, many practical auction problems are combinatorial in nature, requiring carefully designed time-efficient approximation algorithms. Although there have been decades of research in approximating combinatorial auction problems, traditional studies of combinatorial auctions often only consider linear constraints. Namely, the demands for certain goods are limited by the respective supplies, described by linear constraints.
Recently, the rise of smart grid presents a new class of auction problems. One of the salient characteristics is the presence of periodic time-varying entities (e.g., power, voltage, current) in AC (alternating current) electric systems, which are often expressed in terms of complex numbers 1 . In AC electric systems, it is natural to use a quadratic constraint, namely the magnitude of complex numbers, to describe the system capacity. Yu and Chau [12] introduced the complex-demand knapsack problem (CKP) to model a oneshot auction for combinatorial AC electric power allocation, which is a quadratic programming variant of the classical knapsack problem.
Furthermore, future smart grids will be automated by agents representing individual users. Hence, one might expect these agents to be self-interested and may untruthfully report their utilities or demands. This motivates us to consider truthful (aka. incentive-compatible) approximation mechanisms, in which it is in the best interest of the agents to report their true parameters. In [12] a monotone 1 2 -approximation algorithm that induces a deterministic truthful mechanism was devised for the complex-demand knapsack problem, which however assumes that all complexvalued demands lie in the positive quadrant.
In this paper, we provide a complete study and generalize the complex-demand knapsack problem to the multi-minded version, beyond the previously known
In mechanism design setting, where each customer may untruthfully report her utility and demand, it is desirable to design truthful or incentive-compatible approximation mechanisms, in which it is in the best interest of each customer to reveal her true utility and demand [4] . In the so-called single-minded case, a monotone procedure can guarantee incentive compatibility [10] . While the straightforward FP-TAS for 1DKP is not monotone, since the scaling factor involves the maximum item value, [2] gave a monotone FP-TAS, by performing the same procedure with a series of different scaling factors irrelevant to the item values and taking the best solution out of them. Hence, 1DKP admits a truthful FPTAS. More recently, a truthful PTAS, based on dynamic programming and the notion of the so-called maximal-in-range mechanism, was given in [5] for the multiminded case.
As to mDKP with m ≥ 2, a PTAS is given in [6] based on the integer programming formulation, but it is not evident to see whether it is monotone. On the other hand, 2DKP is already inapproximable by an FPTAS unless P = NP, by a reduction from equipartition [8] . Very recently, [9] gave a truthful FPTAS with (1 + )-violation for multi-unit combinatorial auctions with a constant number of distinct goods (including mDKP), and its generalization to the multiplechoice version, when m is fixed. Their technique is based on applying the VCG-mechanism to a rounded problem. Based on the PTAS for the multi-minded 1DKP developed in [5] , they also obtained a truthful PTAS for the multiple-choice multidimensional knapsack problem.
In contrast, non-linear combinatorial auctions were explored to a little extent. Yu and Chau [12] introduced complex-demand knapsack problem, which models auctions with a quadratic constraint.
PROBLEM DEFINITIONS AND NOTATIONS

Complex-demand Knapsack Problem
We adopt the notations from [12] . Our study concerns power allocation under a capacity constraint on the magnitude of the total satisfiable demand (i.e., apparent power). Throughout this paper, we sometimes denote ν R Re(ν) as the real part and ν I Im(ν) as the imaginary part of a given complex number ν. We also interchangeably denote a complex number by a 2D-vector as well as a point in the complex plane. |ν| denotes the magnitude of ν.
We define the single-minded complex-demand knapsack problem (CKP) as follows:
where
k ∈ C is the complex-valued demand of power for k-th user, C ∈ R+ is a real-valued capacity of total satisfiable demand in apparent power. Evidently, CKP is also NP-complete, because the classical 1-dimensional knapsack problem (1DKP) is a special case.
We note that the problem is invariant, when the arguments of all demands are rotated by the same angle. Without loss of generality, we assume that one of the demands, say d1, is aligned along the positive real axis, and define a class of sub-problems for CKP, by restricting the maximum phase angle (i.e., the argument) that any other demand makes with d1. In particular, we will write CKP[φ1, φ2] for the restriction of problem CKP subject to φ1 ≤ max k∈N arg(d k ) ≤ φ2, where arg(d k ) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ N . We remark that in realistic setting of power systems, the active power demand is positive (i.e., d R k ≥ 0), but the power factor (i.e.,
) is bounded by a certain threshold [1] , which is equivalent to restricting the argument of complex-valued demands.
For complexity issues, we will need to specify how the inputs are described. Throughout the paper we will assume that each of the demands is given by its real and imaginary components, represented as rational numbers.
Non-single-minded Complex Knapsack Prob.
In this paper, we extend the single-minded CKP to general non-single-minded version, and then we apply the wellknown VCG-mechanism, or equivalently the framework of maximal-in-range mechanisms [11] . The non-single-minded version is defined as follows. As above we assume a set N of n users: user k has a valuation function v k : D → R+ over a (possibly infinite) set of demands D ⊆ C. We assume that 0 ∈ D and v k (0) = 0 for all k ∈ N . We further assume that each v k is monotone with respect to a partial order " " defined on the elements of C as follows: for d, f ∈ C, d f if and only if
The non-single-minded problem can be described by the following program:
Of particular interest is the multi-minded version of the problem (MultiCKP), defined as follows. Each user k ∈ N is interested only in a polynomial-size subset of demands D k ⊆ D and declares her valuation only over this set. Note that the multi-minded problem can be modeled in the form (NsmCKP) by assuming w.l.o.g. that 0 ∈ D k , for each user k ∈ N , and defining the valuation function v k : D → R+ as follows:
We shall assume that the demand set of each user lies completely in one of the quadrants, namely, either
Note that the single-minded version (which is CKP) is special case, where
We will write MultiCKP[φ1, φ2] for the restriction of the problem subject to φ1 ≤ φ ≤ φ2 for all d ∈ D where φ max d∈D arg(d) (and as before we assume arg(d) ≥ 0).
Multiple-choice Multidimensional Knapsack Problem
To design truthful mechanisms for NsmCKS, it will be useful to consider the multiple-choice multidimensional knapsack problem (Multi-mDKS) defined as follows, where we assume more generally that D ⊆ R m + and a capacity vector c ∈ R m + is given. As before, a valuation function for each user k is given by (6) . An allocation is given an assignment of a demand
The objective is to find an allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ D n so as to maximize the sum of the valuations k∈N v k (d k ). The problem can be described by the following program:
s.t.
Approximation Algorithms
We present an explicit definition of approximation algorithms for our problem. Given a feasible allocation
* be an optimal allocation of NsmCKP (or (MultiCKP)) and Opt v(d * ) be the corresponding total valuation. We are interested in an algorithm that outputs an allocation that is within a factor α of the optimum total valuation, but may violate the capacity constraint by at most a factor of β:
Similarly we define an (α, β)-approximation to MultiCKP.
In particular, polynomial-time approximation scheme (PTAS) is a (1 − , 1)-approximation algorithm for any > 0. The running time of a PTAS is polynomial in the input size for every fixed , but the exponent of the polynomial may depend on 1/ . An even stronger notion is a fully polynomialtime approximation scheme (FPTAS), which requires the running time to be polynomial in both input size and 1/ .
Truthful Mechanisms
This section follows the terminology of [10] . We define truthful (aka. incentive-compatible) approximation mechanisms for our problem. We denote by X ⊆ D n the set of feasible allocations in our problem (NsmCKP or MultimDKP). A mechanism (A, P) is defined by an allocation rule A : V → X and a payment rule P : V → R n + . We assume that the utility of player k, under the mechanism, when it receives the vector of bids v (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V, is defined as
, and P(v) = (p1(v), . . . , pn(v)) andv k denotes the true valuation of player k.
Namely, a mechanism defines an allocation rule and payment scheme, and the utility of a player is defined as the difference between her valuation over her allocated demand and her payment.
Definition 3.3 (Truthful Mechanisms).
A mechanism is said to be truthful if for all k and all v k ∈ V k , and
Namely, the utility of any player is maximized, when she reports the true valuation.
Definition 3.4 (Social Efficiency).
A mechanism is said to be α-socially efficient if for any v ∈ V, it returns an allocation d ∈ X such that the total valuation (also called social welfare) obtained is at least an α-fraction of the optimum:
As in [5, 9, 11] , our truthful mechanisms are based on using VCG payments with Maximal-in-Range (MIR) allocation rules:
Namely, A is an MIR if it maximizes the social welfare over a fixed (declaration-independent) range R of feasible allocations. It is well-known (and also easy to prove by a VCG-based argument) that an MIR, combined with VCG payments (computed with respect to range R), yields a truthful mechanism. If, additionally, the range R satisfies:
Finally a mechanism is computationally efficient if it can be implemented in polynomial time (in the size of the input).
A TRUTHFUL PTAS FOR
The multi-minded mDKP problem was shown in [9] to have a (1 − )-socially efficient truthful PTAS in the setting of multi-unit auctions with a few distinct goods, based on generalizing the result for the case m = 1 in [5] . We explain this result first in our setting, and then use it the Section 4.3 to derive a truthful PTAS for MultiCKP[0,
A Truthful PTAS for Multi-mDKP
Let c = (c 1 , . . . , c m ) be the capacity vector, and for any
Following [9, 11] , we consider a restricted range of allocations defined as follows:
where, for a set N ⊆ N and a partial selection of demands
Note that the range S does not depend on the declarations D1, . . . , Dn. The following two lemmas establish that the range S is a good approximation of the set of all feasible allocations and that it can be optimized over in polynomial time. The first lemma is essentially a generalization of similar one for multi-unit auctions in [5] , with the simplifying difference that we do not insist here on demands to be integral. The second lemma is also a generalization of similar result in [5] , which was stated for the multi-unit auctions with a few distinct goods in [9] . For completeness, we give the details of a slightly simplified version here.
Proof. We first observe that, due to the way the valuations are defined in (6), we may assume for the purpose of computing an optimal allocation d
To maximize over S, with the restriction that D = k D k , we iterate over all subsets N ⊆ N of size at most m and
be as defined in (12) . Without loss of generality, assume N \ N = {1, . . . , n − t}. For k ∈ N \ N and r = (r 1 , . . . , r m ) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , (n − |N |) 2 } m , define U (k, r) to be the maximum value obtained from a subset of users {1, 2, . . . , k} ⊆ N \ N , with user
For two vectors x, y ∈ R m , let us denote by x * y the vector with components (x1y1, . . . , xmym). Define U (1, r) = −∞, if r ≥ 0. Then we can use the following recurrence to compute U (k, r):
Note that the number of possible choices for r is at most n 2m , and hence the total time required by the dynamic program is n O(m) . Finally, given the vector r that maximizes U (n − |N |, r), we can obtain (by tracing back the optimal choices in the table) an optimal vector r k = (r 
It follows that an allocation rule defined as an MIR over range S yields a (1 − )-socially efficient truthful mechanism for Multi-mDKP.
PTAS for
MultiCKP[0, π 2
]
We now apply the result in the previous section to the multi-minded complex-demand knapsack problem, when all agents are restricted to report their demands in the positive quadrant. We begin first by presenting a PTAS without strategic considerations in Section 4.2; then we show next in Section 4.3 how to use this PTAS within the aforementioned framework of MIR's to obtain a truthful mechanism.
In this section we assume that arg(d) ≤
], because one can show that such an approximation ratio is at least a constant factor. This is the case, for instance, if the optimal solution consists of a few large (in magnitude) demands together with many small demands, and it is not clear at what level of accuracy we should polygonize the region to be able to capture these small demands. To overcome this difficulty, we first guess the large demands, then we construct a grid (or a lattice) on the remaining part of the circular region, defining a polygonal region in which we try to pack the maximum-utility set of demands. The latter problem is easily seen to be a special case of the Multi-mDKP problem. The main challenge is to choose the granularity of the grid small enough to wellapproximate the optimal, but also large enough so that the number of sides of the polygon, and hence m is a constant only depending on 1/ .
Without loss of generality, we assume < 1 4
, we define RT as the conic region bounded as the following (see Fig. 1a for an illustration).
where dT d∈T d. Given RT , we define four points in the complex plane (π
Moreover, we define a grid in the region RT by interlacing equidistant horizontal and vertical lines with separation 
Thus, the lines of the grid intersect the circular boundary of region RT at a set of points PT ( ), and we let mT ( ) |PT ( )| ≤ 8 + 2. The convex hull of the set of points PT ( ) ∪
T , 0} defines a polygonized region, which we denote by PT ( ) (see Fig. 1a for an illustration).
Remark 1: For simplicity of presentation, in this section, we will ignore the issue of finite precision needed to represent intermediate calculations (such as the square roots above, or the intersection points of the lines of the gird with the boundary of the circle); we will deal such issues in the next section.
(a) We illustrate the region R T by the shaded area and P T ( ) by the black dots. ]. We define an approximate problem (PGZT ) by polygonizing MultiCKP[0,
Given two complex numbers µ and ν, we denote the projection of µ on ν by Pj ν (µ)
. Given the convex hull PT ( ), we define a set of mT ( ) vectors {σ T i }, each of which is perpendicular to each boundary edge of PT ( ) and starting at the origin (see Fig. 1b for an illustration). ]. We define a Multi-mDKP problem based on {σ T i }:
Lemma 4.5. Given a feasible set T to MultiCKP[0, ] is described in Algorithm MultiCKP-PTAS, which enumerates every subset partial selection T of at most 1 demands, then finds a near optimal allocation for each polygonized region PT ( ) using the PTAS of Multi-mDKP from Section 4.1, which we denote by Multi-mDKP-PTAS[·]. 
].
The running time of the algorithm is
Require: Users' multi-minded valuations {v k , D k } k∈N ; capacity C; accuracy parameter Ensure: (1−3 )-allocation ( d1, . . . , dn) to MultiCKP[0,
Set dT ← d∈T d, and define the corresponding vectors {σ
Obtain (d1, . . . , dn) 
. . , dn) is feasible to PGZT for some T of size at most 1 . By Lemma 4.5, invoking the PTAS of Multi-mDKP{σ
We give an explicit construction of the allocation ( d1, . . . , dn) in Algorithm 2, thus completing the proof by Lemma 4.7. 
Proof. In Algorithm 2, let¯ and T¯ be the values of and T at the end of the repeat-until loop (line 9).
The basic idea of Algorithm 2 is that we first construct a nested sequence of sets of demands T0 ⊂ T1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ T¯ , such that a demand is included in each iteration if it has either a large real component or a large imaginary component. The iteration proceeds until a sufficiently large number of demands have been summed up (namely, |T¯ | ≥ 1 ), or no demands with large components remain. At the end of the iteration, if the condition in line 11 holds, then S = T , i.e., the whole set S can be packed within the polygonized region PT¯ ( ). Otherwise, we find a subset of S that is feasible to PGZT¯ .
To do so, we partition S\T¯ into at least 1 −1 groups, each having a large component along either the real or the imaginary axes, with respect to the boundaries of the region RT¯ . Then removing the group with smallest utility among these, or removing one of the large demands with smallest utility will ensure that remaining demands have a large utility and can be packed within PT¯ ( ).
We then have to consider two cases (line 14): (i) |T¯ | becomes at least 1 , or (ii) S R ∪S Ī = ∅. For case (i), we proceed to line 16 -we combine the demands in S\T¯ into a group V1. Note that removing any one demand k ∈ T¯ will make T¯ \{k} as a feasible solution to PGZT¯ (since the lengths w R T i and w I T i are monotone decreasing for i = 1, 2, . . .). For case (ii), we can apply Lemma 4.8 below to partition S\T¯ into at least 1 − 1 groups {V1, . . . , V h }, where each group Vj has a large total component along either the real or the imaginary axes (precisely, greater than 4 w R or 4 w Ī respectively). This implies that removing any group Vj will make T¯ ∪ j =j V j a feasible solution to PGZT¯ .
To conclude, there are either (i) at least 1 demands in |T¯ |,
We define S by deleting a minimum utility demand or group of demands from S (lines 24 and 27). Then, we set
Remark 2: It is important to note in algorithm Construct that, when we drop a single vector from T (when the condition
then we can redefine T = T and use this to define the polygon PT ( ). In particular, we may assume when solving problem Multi-mDKP{σ Then there exists a partition {V1, . . . , V h } of S\T such that
A Truthful PTAS for multiCKP[0,
π 2 ] We now state our main result for this section. Proof. It is enough to define a declaration-independent range S of feasible allocations, such that max d∈S v(d) ≥ (1 − 3 ) · Opt, and we can optimize over S in the stated time. For every set T ⊆ D of size at most 1 , we solve a slightly modified version of problem Multi-mDKP{σ T i }:
• We choose the grid lines from a fixed set, where all horizontal and vertical lines are at distances, form the real and imaginary axes, which are integer multiples of C 2 i , for some integer i ∈ Z+. In particular, instead of defining the grid separation distances to be (
Require: Users' valuations {v k } k∈N ; a feasible allocation d; capacity C; accuracy parameter Ensure: A set of demands T ⊆ {d1, . . . , dn} and a feasible allocation
Find a subset of large demands T 2: repeat 3:
← + 1 4:
Find a subset S ⊂ S that is feasible to PGZT 14:
T ← the set of the first 1 elements added to T 16:
Find a partition V1, . . . , V h over S\T such that
, where i(T ) and j(T ) are the smallest integers such that
and
.
In this case, we say that the vertical and horizontal lines are at levels i(T ) and j(T ), respectively. Let us denote by L1(i(T )) the vertical grid lines at level i(T ), and by L2(j(T )) the horizontal grid lines at level j(T ).
• We also slightly change the definition of the polygon PT ( ) by expanding the region RT slightly so that its vertical and horizontal boundary lines are from L1(i(T )) and L2(j(T )), respectively.
• We solve problem Multi-mDKP{σ It is straightforward to verify that these changes will only possibly increase the size of PT ( ) by a factor of 2, but otherwise, all other claims (in particular, Lemma 4.7) remain valid. As we shall see below, these modifications are only needed to ensure computational efficiency.
For T ⊆ D, let G(T ) be the set of vectors in C defined by the union of {dT } and (a) the (component-wise) minimal grid points z inside RT , only considering lines L1(i(T ) + 1) and L2(j(T ) + 1), that have exclusively either i({z}) = i(T ) + 1 or j({z}) = j(T ) + 1, and (b) the (component-wise) minimal grid points z inside RT , only considering lines in L1(i(T ) + 1) and L2(j(T ) + 1), that have i({z}) = i(T ) + 1 and j({z}) = j(T )+1. For z ∈ G(T ), let us denote by Sz the range of feasible allocations defined as in (13) 
Proof. Suppose that dT + κ ∈ PT ( ). Then it also holds that d T + κ ∈ PT ( ) (since d T dT ). This implies that both dT +κ and d T +κ lie within the same grid cell in PT ( ), and hence d
, follows that i(T ) ≤ i(T ) + 1. Similarly, we have j(T ) ≤ j(T ) + 1.
By this claim, we can solve the optimization problem over
is an optimal allocation over S, but such that d * ∈ S z for some z ∈ G(T ), T ⊆ D, and
, and we (temporarily) keep 
where the equality follows from (the proof of) Lemma 4.2. On the other hand, if (ii) holds, then i(T ) ∈ {i(T ), i(T )+1} and j(T ) ∈ {j(T ), j(T ) + 1}. In this case, if i(T ) = i(T ) and j(T ) = j(T ) then P T ( ) ⊆ PT ( ) (since dT d T ); otherwise, there is a point z ∈ G(T ) such that z z , i(T ∪ {z − dT }) = i({z }) and j(T ∪ {z − dT }) = j({z }). Then dT + κ d T + κ ∈ P {z} ( ), and we get again (17).
A TRUTHFUL FPTAS FOR MULTICKP[0, π-ε]
As in [9] , the basic idea is to round off the set of possible demands to obtain a range, by which we can optimize over in polynomial time using dynamic programming (to obtain an MIR).
Let
, 0}, where φ max d∈D arg(d). We assume that tan θ is bounded by an a-priori known polynomial P (n) ≥ 1 in n, that is independent of the customers valuations. We can upper bound the total projections for any feasible allocation d = (d1, . . . , dn) of demands as follows:
, and for d ∈ D, define the new rounded demand d as follows:
Consider an optimal allocation d
Let ξ+ (and ξ−), ζ+ (and ζ−) be the respective guessed real and imaginary absolute total projections of the rounded demands in S * + {k : d 
be the subsets of users with demand sets in the first and second quadrants respectively (recall that we restrict users' demand sets to allow such a partition).
The basic idea of Algorithm MultiCKP-biFPTAS is to enumerate the guessed total projections on real and imaginary axes for S * + and S * − respectively. We then solve two separate Multi-2DKP problems (one for each quadrant) to find subsets of demands that satisfy the individual guessed total projections. But since Multi-2DKP is generally NPhard, we need to round the demands to get a problem that can be solved efficiently by dynamic programming. We note that the violation of the optimal solution to the rounded problem w.r.t. to the original problem is small in .
The next step is to solve the each rounded instance exactly. Assume an arbitrary order on N = {1, ..., n}. We define a 3D table, with each entry U (k, c1, c2) being the maximum utility obtained from a subset of users {1, 2, . . . , k} ⊆ N , each with choosing from D, that can fit exactly (i.e., satisfies the capacity constraint as an equation) within capacity c1 on the real axis and c2 on the imaginary axis. This table can be filled-up by standard dynamic programming; we de- if (ξ+ − ξ−) 2 + (ζ+ + ζ−) 2 ≤ (1 + 2 ) 2 C 2 then 6:
7: The following lemma states that the allocation returned by MultiCKP-biFPTAS does not violate the capacity constraint by more than a factor of 1 + 3 . Proof. We define a declaration-independent range S as follows. For ξ+ ∈ A+, ξ− ∈ A−, ζ+, ζ− ∈ B, define S ξ + ,ξ + ,ζ−+,ζ − {d = (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ D n + :
Define further S (ξ + −ξ − ) 2 +(ζ + +ζ − ) 2 ≤(1+2 ) 2 C 2 S ξ + ,ξ + ,ζ−+,ζ − .
Using Algorithm MultiCKP-biFPTAS, we can optimize over S in time polynomial in n and 1 . Thus, it remains only to argue that the algorithm returns a (1, 1+3 )-approximation w.r.t. the original range D n . To see this, let d * 1 , . . . , d * n ∈ D be the demands allocated in the optimum solution to Multi-CKP, and d1, . . . , dn ∈ D be the demands allocated by MultiCKP-biFPTAS. Then by Lemma 5.1, the truncated optimal allocation ( d * 1 , . . . , d * n ) is feasible with respect to a capacity of (1 + 2 )C, and thus its projections will satisfy the condition in Step 5 of Algorithm 3. It follows that
where the second inequality follows from the way we round demands (18) and the monotonicity of the valuations. Finally, the fact that the solution returned byMultiCKP-biFPTAS violates the capacity constraint by a factor of at most (1 + 3 ) follows readily from Lemma 5.2.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we provided truthful mechanisms for an important variant of the knapsack problem with complexvalued demands. We gave a truthful PTAS when all demand sets of users lie in the positive quadrant, and a bi-criteria truthful FPTAS when some of the demand sets can lie in the second quadrant. In the full version of the paper, we show that these are essentially the best possible results in terms of approximation guarantees, assuming P =NP.
